The October 7 map of responsibility is incomplete without the map of appointments: Who failed and who placed them in the role?

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Intelligence did not provide a warning that would allow preparations to prevent the surprise. The border defense array was breached. Outposts and communities were attacked simultaneously, command and control systems struggled to comprehend the scale of the event, and many forces arrived late to the scenes. The IDF itself later determined that it failed in its primary mission that day: defending the citizens of the State of Israel. By November 2025, command measures had already been taken against a series of officers for command responsibility for the events. But a system is not an abstract entity. It has commanders. These commanders were appointed, promoted, and stationed in key roles over the years; therefore, the map of responsibility for October 7 is incomplete without the map of appointments. At the top of the military pyramid, the Chief of Staff on the morning of October 7 was Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi. Herzi Halevi was chosen for the role of Chief of Staff by Benny Gantz, who was then Minister of Defense. In September 2022, Gantz announced that he was choosing Halevi as the 23rd Chief of Staff. Following the appointment process, the government headed by Yair Lapid approved the appointment on October 23, 2022. Halevi officially took office on January 16, 2023. After the disaster, he took explicit responsibility for the IDF's failure. In February 2025, he told IDF commanders: “The responsibility is mine, I am the commander of the military on 7.10.” In January of that year, he announced that he would step down “out of recognition of my responsibility for the IDF’s failure on October 7.” During his career, he served as Head of Aman, then as Commander of the Southern Command, then as Deputy Chief of Staff, and finally as Chief of Staff. In other words, when the disaster occurred, the IDF was headed by an officer who already knew from the inside both the intelligence apparatus and the command responsible for the Gaza sector.

And what happened after Halevi became Chief of Staff?

One of the significant appointment decisions during his tenure directly concerned the Gaza sector. On May 3, 2023, it was published that following the recommendation of Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Brigadier General Yaron Finkelman would be appointed Commander of the Southern Command and promoted to the rank of Major General.

Finkelman took office on July 9, 2023. Less than three months later, the October 7 attack took place; Yaron Finkelman Halevi recommended, and within less than three months October 7 arrived Major General Yaron Finkelman was Commander of the Southern Command on the morning of the attack. His appointment is especially important for understanding the chain of appointments because it is one of the appointments closest in time to the disaster. The IDF's official source explicitly documents that in May 2023 Finkelman was recommended for the position by Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi. He took office in July, replacing Major General Eliezer Toledano. That is:

Herzi Halevi → recommended Yaron Finkelman → Commander of the Southern Command. After the disaster, Finkelman took responsibility for the failure in defending the western Negev, and subsequently the IDF determined that he bore command responsibility for the events of October 7 by virtue of his position. It is important to be precise: The fact that a commander recommended an officer does not automatically make him responsible for every future decision of that officer. However, when examining how the chain of command of October 7 was assembled, this is a significant factual connection. Avi Rosenfeld, Commander of the Gaza Division. Avi Rosenfeld was appointed Commander of the Gaza Division during the tenure of Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi. Beneath the Commander of the Southern Command lies one of the most relevant positions to the event: Commander of the Gaza Division. On the morning of October 7, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld held the position. Rosenfeld assumed the role on August 15, 2022, replacing Brigadier General Nimrod Aloni. His handover ceremony was held at the Re'im base, led by then-Commander of the Southern Command, Major General Eliezer Toledano. But to understand the appointment, one must go back several months. In a placement discussion chaired by the Chief of Staff, it had already been decided earlier that: “Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld will be appointed Commander of the Gaza Division.” Rosenfeld did not come out of nowhere. Prior to that, he commanded the 99th Division, and in August 2022 moved from it directly to command the Gaza Division. In other words, the military system marked him as a suitable officer to command one of the most sensitive sectors in Israel. On October 7, that division stood at the center of the operational collapse at the border. Subsequently, the IDF officially determined that Rosenfeld bore command responsibility for the events by virtue of his role as Commander of the Gaza Division. Aharon Haliva – and the appointment that led him to Head of Intelligence One of the most central figures on the intelligence axis was Major General Aharon Haliva, Head of the Military Intelligence Directorate. And here there is no need to guess who promoted the appointment. On February 11, 2021, the IDF published an official announcement: Then-Defense Minister approved the recommendation of Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi to appoint Aharon Haliva as Head of the Military Intelligence Directorate. Haliva was at the time Head of the Operations Directorate. Aviv Kochavi → recommended Aharon Haliva → Head of Aman. However, that same appointment announcement reveals another important detail. Kochavi did not only recommend Haliva in that round. That same decision also determined that: Oded Basyuk would be appointed Head of the Operations Directorate; and Eliezer Toledano would be appointed Commander of the Southern Command. Thus, in a single round of appointments in February 2021, on the recommendation of Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi and with the approval of Defense Minister Benny Gantz, three significant focal points in the military leadership were shaped: Aharon Haliva to head Aman, Oded Basyuk to head the Operations Directorate, and Eliezer Toledano to the Southern Command Ronen Bar – Head of the Shin Bet

Outside the IDF chain of command was another security agency with significant intelligence responsibility regarding Hamas: the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet).

Ronen Bar headed the agency.

Bar did not come from outside. He grew up within the Shin Bet for decades and held a series of senior positions before reaching the head of the organization. The appointment of the Shin Bet chief was approved in 2021, and he assumed office on October 14 of that year. The official publication in Reshumot documents the government's decision to appoint him and the date the appointment took effect. Bar himself later described October 7 as the Shin Bet's greatest point of failure. Here too, it is important to distinguish between two questions:

Who selected and appointed the head of the agency; and what was his professional responsibility once he had already assumed command. These are not the same question, but both are part of the history of the system that arrived at October 7

Ronen Bar was chosen as Shin Bet chief by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in 2021. R

When placing the appointments side by side, a picture emerges that is not seen when examining each person individually.

Aviv Kochavi

During his tenure as Chief of Staff, several key appointments were made:

Aharon Haliva → Head of Aman

Oded Basyuk → Head of the Operations Directorate

Eliezer Toledano → Commander of the Southern Command

and during his tenure, Yossi Sariel entered → command of 8200. The decision to appoint Avi Rosenfeld → as Commander of the Gaza Division was also made during Kochavi's tenure. Herzi Halevi

After entering the role of Chief of Staff, he recommended:

Yaron Finkelman → Commander of the Southern Command. Finkelman took office in July 2023 – less than three months before the attack.

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On that morning, the central chain of command looked like this:

Herzi Halevi – Chief of Staff

Beneath him on the intelligence axis:

Aharon Haliva – Head of Aman

And beneath the Aman system:

Yossi Sariel – Commander of 8200

And on the border defense axis:

Yaron Finkelman – Commander of the Southern Command

And beneath him:

Avi Rosenfeld – Commander of the Gaza Division

And parallel to the military system:

Ronen Bar – Head of the Shin Bet

These were some of the key officeholders in the systems that were supposed to identify the threat, evaluate it, and defend against it. Herzi Halevi personally took overall responsibility for the IDF's failure and said that as commander of the military, the responsibility was his. In November 2025, the IDF published a series of command decisions following an examination of the events of October 7. Among other things, command responsibility was determined regarding senior officers in the relevant arrays, including Aharon Haliva, Yossi Sariel, and Avi Rosenfeld, as well as other officeholders. After a systemic failure on the scale of October 7, the map of appointments becomes a legitimate professional question:

Who chose the people?

In what roles did they serve previously?

Who recommended promoting them?

Did the same commanders and professional concepts recur along the promotion chain?

And above all:

Did the promotion system know how to reward officers who challenged accepted concepts as well – or primarily those who grew within them?

The last question requires additional evidence before it can be answered. But the very posing of it stems from the documented map of appointments.

The inquiry into October 7 does not end with the question:

“Who was in office?”

It continues to the question:

“Who chose them for the role?”

And after it comes the harder question:

How did a system that succeeded in placing in each of its key stations officers with decades of experience, achievements, and promotions arrive at a morning where intelligence, warning, and border defense failed together?

This is not proof that a specific appointment caused the disaster.

But that is precisely why the chain of appointments is an inseparable part of the story of October 7. Because if one wants to understand how a systemic failure was created – one must examine not only the people who failed within the system, but also how the system selected the people who led it